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Some Recent Developments
in British Company Law
K. W. Wedderhurn*

Since the Report in 1962 of the "Jenkins Committee" on Company Law
(Cmnd. 1749), it cannot be said that British company law has been developed either by the legislature or by the courts along any clear line of policy.
The Companies Act 1967 enacted a limited number of proposals of the
Jenkins Committee and certain parts of this statute together with some
leading judicial decisions have been selected for comment below. All relate
to the central point of tension in company law: the theory that management
is accountable to the shareholders and the fact, increasingly reflected in the
case law, of directors exercising power in corporate affairs. A fresh investigation into the whole field of company law has been initiated by the
new Government in 1971.

The Companies Act 1967 concentrated largely upon extending the
ambit of enforced disclosure of corporate affairs. First, the traditional
category of private company-since 1948 the obscurely defined "exempt"
private company-which was exempt from filing the financial details required of the public company, was abolished by the Act. The law reverted
to the original philosophy of 1855, namely, that the price of limited liability
should be full disclosure.
The ambit of such disclosure is expanded. The filed accounts, for example, must include new items, including the turnover for the financial year
where that does not exceed £50,000; and the directors' report must attribute the proportions of such turnover to different classes of business. That
report is also now required to describe significant changes in the fixed
assets of the company or subsidiaries; arrangements or contracts under
which directors may benefit or have an interest; the reason for new issues
Cassel Professor of Commercial Law in the University of London (London School of
Economics); Barrister-at-Law Middle Temple; co-editor of Gower's "Modern Company
Law."
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of shares; and other particulars "material for the appreciation of the state
of the company's affairs," so long as that disclosure "will not in the opinion
of the directors be harmful to the business of the company."
The accounts must include new detail specifying subsidiary companies,
other companies in which the company holds more than one-tenth of the
shares in nominal value, and, in the case of a subsidiary, the identity of the
"company's ultimate holding company." The company, if quoted on a
Stock Exchange, must maintain a register recording the interests of those
who own one-tenth or more of shares with unrestricted voting rights. To
the previous requirement of the 1948 Companies Act that aggregate annual
emoluments of directors be disclosed, is now added the demand where the
aggregate exceeds £7500 for individual emoluments of the chairman and
of any director paid more than he is; and the number of directors falling
into "brackets" of zero to £2,500, £2,500 to £5,000, and so on. A
significant extension is made by the parallel requirement for disclosure in
similar "brackets" of the number of employees receiving more than
£ 10,000 a year.
The demands for disclosure in the traditional interests of shareholders
and creditors are extended also to donations for political and charitable
purposes in excess of £50 (though it is mysterious why the legislature did
not regard noncharitable gifts as equally in need of disclosure). But new
policy reasons seem to lie beneath the demand for details of the annual
aggregate payroll (of greater interest to collective bargaining than investors) and of goods exported (details clearly of general public interest). A
certain equivocation also appears in the Act as to the adequacy of the
disclosure philosophy in dealing with "insider trading." Various loopholes
are plugged in the register recording interests in his company's securities
held by a director (and, now, by his immediate family), so that this register
should be both up to date and available. But side by side with that reform,
the Act makes into a criminal offence the director's dealings in options in
securities of a quoted company or its associated companies. The Board of
Trade is given new powers to investigate improper or unregistered directors' dealings in securities. We return later to the position of the Board of
Trade.
II
The judiciary is still dominated in company matters, both by the philosophy of formal disclosure to the shareholders and by the doctrine that it is
impermissible for the courts to intervene to carry on the business or alter,
except in extreme cases, the relations of members of the company. A good
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 3
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example arose in connection with section 184 of the 1948 Act, whereby a
resolution passed by simple majority in general meeting can dismiss any
director, notwithstanding a provision in the articles or a contract between
him and the company.
In Bushell v Faith [1970] 1 W.L.R. 272, articles weighted the voting
rights of shares held by a director on any motion to remove him from office
so that, in effect, he could not be removed without his concurrence. The
trial judge held that such articles were invalid as they made "a mockery" of
S. 184. The House of Lords by majority disagreed, upholding the articles
and the director's entrenched position, despite the clear policy of the
section. Lord Upjohn stated that
Parliament has never sought to fetter the right of the company to issue a
share with such rights and restrictions as it may think fit;
and asked where was the court to stop once it altered the voting rights as
stated in the articles:
Suppose there had here been some preference shares in the name of [the
defendant's] wife which under the articles had in the circumstances no
vote.... I only raise this purely hypothetical case to show the great difficulty
of trying to do justice by legislation in a matter which has always been left to
the corporators themselves to decide.
A rather similar failure to adopt a robust and creative approach to
statutory provisions introduced to limit management's powers is seen in
recent decisions on section 210 of the 1948 Act, which purports to give
minority shareholders a right to any appropriate remedy where the affairs
of the company have been conducted in a manner "oppressive" to the
minority, and in such a way that would have allowed the court to wind up
the company on "just and equitable" grounds (s.222 (f)). Oppression has
been judicially held to include anything "burdensome, harsh or wrongful."
Nevertheless, in Re Five-Minute Car Wash Service Ltd. [1966] 1 W.L.R.
745, Buckley J. refused a remedy, even assuming the truth of allegations
that the controlling director had so conducted the business that he had by
gross mismanagement ruined its commercial and financial position. This,
said the judge, suggested that he was "unwise, inefficient and careless in
the performance of his duties." Moreover, "mere dissatisfaction with or
disapproval of the conduct of the company's affairs, whether on grounds
relating to policy or to efficiency, however well founded" cannot constitute
oppression.
A similarly restrictive attitude is apparent in the Court of Appeal decision in Re Westbourne Galleries Ltd. [1971] 3 All E.R. 561, in which the
court jettisoned previous principles which permitted a "just and equitable"
winding up on broad grounds where the company was a small
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 3
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"quasi-partnership." The Court now demands, in the absence of positive
misfeasance or disappearance of the substratum of the company, positive
proof of lack of bona fides in the defendant controllers. Such narrow
judicial views have made the outcome of certain pending appeals critical
for the future development of British company law-for example, in Re
Jermyn Street Turkish Baths Ltd. where the first instance judge decided,
inter alia, that directors could engage in "oppression," by taking fees and
emoluments which were in the opinion of the court "unreasonable": [1970]
3 All E.R. 57.
The importance of such decisions is emphasized by the difficulties which
beset the minority shareholders who wished to bring an action, derivative
or personal against directors who have allegedly broken their fiduciary
duties. These duties are couched in strict terms, for example in the prohibition of "secret profits" made in the execution of the office. That strictness
was re-emphasized by the reasoning in the House of Lords in a recent
decision on constructive trustees: Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 A.C. 46
[where some of the Law Lords suggest that information can be trust-or
corporate -"property" in a manner parallel to the judgment in Diamond v
Oreamuno 301 N.Y.S. 2d 78 (1969)]. But the strictness is nullified by the
rule that such breach of duty can be validated by a simple majority vote of
shareholders, except when the directors have actually expropriated corporate assets in which case they are in a more strict sense "trustees" of the
property (Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd. v. Cradock [19681 i
W.L.R. 1555).
The fiduciary duty demands that directors act in the best interests of the
company, not for a collateral purpose. In Bamford v Bamford [1969] 2
W.L.R. 1107, C.A., directors had power under the articles to issue unissued shares; but they exercised this power not to raise new capital but to
keep themselves in office by putting votes into friendly hands and so ward
off a bid to take over the company by acquisition of its shares. This, the
court held, following previous cases, was a "collateral" purpose in breach
of their fiduciary duty even if done bona fide, and moreover could be
attacked by a minority shareholder in court in what seems to have been a
derivative action. So strong, however, is the tradition of disclosure and
shareholders' control, that the court further decided that the issue could be
properly put to a general meeting of the shareholders, and be validated by
simple majority vote there-a vote which the directors, by their control of
the proxy machinery and in other ways, had no difficulty in achieving. In
this, and other cases, the English courts have shown that they are unlikely
to favor an effective extension of shareholders' control over management
by means of the derivative action.
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Finally, a brief survey of other judicial decisions discloses that the
courts, without perhaps so intending, have increased the strength of the
directors' position. The ancient doctrine of ultra vires provides an example,
applying as it still does in England, to render void any transaction falling
outside the objects express or implied in the company's memorandum.
More than one committee has recommended a change in the law on this
matter which, with the drafting of prolix objects clauses, has largely lost its
rationale. Where the transaction is expressly within an object it is not ultra
vires by reason of an ulterior purpose of management [CharterbridgeCorp.
Ltd. v. Lloyds Bank Ltd. [1970] Ch. 62]; but the courts have refused to
uphold a sub-clause stating that it was an express independent object of a
company to "borrow money," because borrowing was not an object but a
power and "borrowing is not an end in itself, and must be for some purpose
of the company; and as this borrowing was for an ultra vires purpose that it
is an end of the matter" [Harman L.J. Re Introductions Ltd. [1969] 1 All
E.R. 887, 889; thereby preventing the bank from recovering a loan of
money].
The predominance, however, of express powers even allowed the court
to uphold expulsion of members from a company limited by guarantee,
without their being given the chance to answer charges according to the
principles of natural justice. The governing council had an unfettered
power to expel and, in a company as opposed to a trade union or club, that,
said Megarry J., was sufficient: Gaiman v National Association of Mental
Health [1970] 2 All E.R. 362.
The very core of the ultra vires principle may have received a death
blow, moreover, in the Court of Appeal in Bell Houses Ltd. v. City Wall
Properties Ltd. [1966] 2 Q.B. 656. A company with various objects of a
property business also had a sub-clause permitting it "to carry on any other
trade or business whatsoever which can, in the opinion of the board of
directors, be advantageously carried on by the company in connection with
or as ancillary to any of the above business." Since 1890 it had been
thought that no such subjective formula could be accepted as the statement
of a corporate object as demanded by the statute. The Court of Appeal,
however, decided otherwise. This means that, with a subjectively worded
objects clause, management would be free to use the assets for whatever
purpose it bona fide thought fit as beneficial to the company.
III
Commentators who see the larger corporation as having long ago passed
out of effective shareholders' control in the "managerial revolution," will
see these developments as little more than a belated recognition of reality.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 6, No. 3
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Even those who still urged shareholders' control as a necessary part of the
market mechanism even in giant companies (a quaint belief still to be found
in influential quarters), have to face the fact that, despite new statutory
intervention, company law appears inexorably to move towards greater
control in the hands of management. In Britain, the only administrative
agency with power to intervene is the Board of Trade, which has certain
limited powers to investigate company affairs. Those powers have been
used in such a sparing fashion as to draw the comment:
The policy of the Board of Trade in treating inspections as fact finding
inquiries in effect amounts to an almost direct denial of the possibility of using
its powers either as a preventive measure or as an integral part of the process
of law enforcement (T. Hadden, Control of Company Fraud, P.E.P. 1968, p.
318).

-

The Companies Act 1967 gave new powers to the Board to investigate
directors' share dealings and to demand information and papers from a
company without the embarrassing formality of a full investigation. But so
far there is little evidence that the policy of the Board has changed into
anything more aggressive or interventionist than in the past.
In characteristic British fashion, the major piece of machinery constructed in the last five years to control company practice, has been a "voluntary" body which has no statutory or legal foundation. All the major City
institutions, including the Bank of England, the issuing houses, the insurance companies, the clearing banks and London Stock Exchange, set up
the "Take-Over Panel" to administer the City Code on Take-overs and
Mergers (now in revised form, 1969). The Code sets out twelve "Principles" and thirty-five "Rules," placing special weight upon the treatment
of all shareholders equally in take-overs, and the duty of directors to give
impartial consideration to different offers. Nevertheless, it is still an open
question whether this voluntary body can enforce a code of practice which
conforms to the standards expected by public opinion. There have already
been notable cases of large companies choosing to ignore the decisions of
the Panel.
Until recently, there were other statutory bodies of which mention
would have to be made in regard to the tender issue of mergers. Under a
statute of1965, for example, the Board of Trade acquired power to refer
mergers which would either dominate one third of a market or involve
assets exceeding £5 million to the Monopolies Commission; and if the
Commission decided the merger was contrary to the public interest, the
Board acquired wide powers to prevent or unscramble the merger. But
neither the last (Labour) nor the present (Conservative) administration has
shown strong desire to use these powers. A further statute of 1966 estabInternational Lawyer, Vol. 6, No. 3
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lished the Industrial Reorganization Corporation with powers of facilitating
(rather than preventing) larger units in industry in the interests of
efficiency: but this corporation has now been abolished by the new Government.
The new committee inquiring into the reform of company law is likely,
therefore, to be driven by various pressures to consideration of the establishment by statute of a new administrative agency to control corporate
management and protect investors. As it has recently been put:
It is coming to be accepted that unless the Take-Over Panel can show that it
is able to produce and enforce observance of a strict code of conduct,
supervision through a state organ-a miniature S.E.C. will be inevitable
(Gower, Company Law 1969, p. 627).
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